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Abstract
Background: Transparency in quality of care is an increasingly important issue in healthcare. In many international 
healthcare systems, transparency in quality is crucial for health insurers when purchasing care on behalf of their 
consumers, for providers to improve the quality of care (if necessary), and for consumers to choose their provider in case 
treatment is needed. Conscious consumer choices incentivize healthcare providers to deliver better quality of care. This 
paper studies the impact of quality on patient volume and hospital choice, and more specifically whether high quality 
providers are able to attract more patients. 
Methods: The dataset covers the period 2006-2011 and includes all patients who underwent a cataract treatment in 
the Netherlands. We first estimate the impact of quality on volume using a simple ordinary least squares (OLS), second 
we use a mixed logit to determine how patients make trade-offs between quality, distance and waiting time in provider 
choice. 
Results: At the aggregate-level we find that, a one-point quality increase, on a scale of one to a hundred, raises patient 
volume for the average hospital by 2-4 percent. This effect is mainly driven by the hospital with the highest quality score: 
the effect halves after excluding this hospital from the dataset. Also at the individual-level, all else being equal, patients 
have a stronger preference for the hospital with the highest quality score, and appear indifferent between the remaining 
hospitals.
Conclusion: Our results suggest that the top performing hospital is able to attract significantly more patients than the 
remaining hospitals. We find some evidence that a small share of consumers may respond to quality differences, thereby 
contributing to incentives for providers to invest in quality and for insurers to take quality into account in the purchasing 
strategy. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Quality competition among hospitals might be possible to a certain degree.
• Only top performing hospitals attract patients from all over the country.
• Most patients choose a hospital in their own region.
• Patients do not seem to respond to all types of quality indicators. Patients seem to be more responsive to outcome indicators than to process 
indicators. 
Implications for the public
Conscious consumer choices may incentivize healthcare providers to deliver better quality of care. This paper studies the impact of quality on 
hospital volume and hospital choice for cataract treatments in the Netherlands. We find that the top performing hospital is able to attract significantly 
more patients than the remaining hospitals.
Key Messages 
Background 
Transparency in hospital quality is essential as it contributes to 
a patients’ ability to make the appropriate hospital choice. In the 
Netherlands, after the introduction of managed competition 
in 2006, hospitals started to bargain with health insurers 
over prices, quality and volume of care. Insurers are likely to 
be more incentivized to reward quality in their purchasing 
strategy if consumers indeed take quality into account in 
their provider choice. A necessary condition for competition 
to work is that patients respond to quality differences across 
providers. As a result, better performing hospitals would 
attract more patients.1 Providers are increasingly incentivized 
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to invest in quality thereby contributing to quality of 
healthcare in the system. The central question of our paper is 
whether cataract patients take quality into account in hospital 
choice, and whether high quality hospitals are able to attract 
more patients. 
Evidence suggests that consumers tend to choose better 
performing providers and are responsive to initiatives that 
provide quality information.2 The decision to visit a hospital 
may depend on various factors. Besides quality, distance to 
a hospital, waiting time and information of third parties are 
also important factors for consumers. In the Netherlands, 
consumers may retrieve information on quality via the 
patients’ general practitioner (GP), family and friends and 
from publicly available quality data.3
Several studies have explored the impact of quality on hospital 
volume (aggregate-level) and or hospital choice (individual-
level). Most studies find this impact to be positive but small, 
and some find a weak or no significant impact.4-16 Over time, 
exploring the impact of quality on hospital choice has become 
the preferred method.11 Moreover, some studies have found 
nonlinear trends in responding to quality information, these 
studies tend to find that patients avoid relatively bad hospitals 
and highly ranked hospitals are not able to attract significantly 
more patients.17-19 This latter finding is counterintuitive. Like 
in other competitive markets, high-ranked providers that 
excel and differentiate with respect to quality are expected to 
attract significantly more patients than their competitors. Our 
contribution to the literature is that we test this hypothesis by 
using a quality indicator that measures reputation of hospitals 
that perform cataract treatments in the Netherlands for the 
period 2006-2011. 
Cataracts are “changes in clarity of the natural lens inside the 
eye that gradually degrade visual quality.”20 Cataracts tend 
to develop over time, and may lead to vision impairment 
and blindness.21,22 In 2010, cataract was the main cause for 
blindness worldwide.21 Blindness is more common among 
old age (although it does also exist at younger ages).22 
Furthermore, visual impairment is more common amongst 
women than among men.22 Cataract is a condition that is fully 
treatable,21 it involves a surgical procedure where the old lens 
is removed and replaced with a new one.23 Moreover, cataract 
treatments are fairly standard procedures and are associated 
with low medical risk[1].24 
In the Netherlands, cataract treatments may be carried out in 
a hospital or in an independent clinical practice (in Dutch: 
Zelfstandig Behandelcentra). Historically, practically all 
Dutch hospitals provided cataract treatments and recently 
more and more independent treatment centers entered the 
market. Depending on a patient’s insurance product type, 
either all providers may be covered (and fully reimbursed), 
or only contracted providers are reimbursed, and patients are 
required to pay a (small) share of the costs for non-contracted 
care providers. At the point of study, there is little selective 
contracting. Furthermore, patients require a referral from 
their GP to access medical specialist care, but have freedom 
with respect to provider choice. 
The market for cataract treatments lends itself for this analysis 
because: (1) quality data at the treatment level is publicly 
available and reported quality differences are present, (2) 
cataract treatments are non-emergent and fairly standard 
procedures, (3) cataract treatments are carried out in 
practically all Dutch hospitals, and (4) patients have freedom 
with respect to provider choice. 
This paper follows the strategy of Pope4 by starting with 
an aggregate-level analysis followed by an individual level-
analysis. The paper starts in section 2 with a brief review of 
the relevant literature, a description of the dataset and the data 
analysis is given in the section 3, followed by the individual-
level and aggregate-level results in section 4. The paper 
concludes with a conclusion and discussion in section 5. 
Literature Review
In the health economics literature, the impact of quality has 
been investigated at the aggregate-level and at the individual-
level. At the aggregate-level, studies explore the impact of 
quality on hospital volume.4-6,12,13 At the individual-level, 
studies investigate the impact of quality on a patients’ hospital 
choice and relate this to factors such as hospital distance and 
waiting time.4,8,9,14-16,18,19,25,26 One advantage of the individual-
level approach over the aggregate-level approach is that it 
enables estimating how patients make trade-offs between 
quality and other factors such as distance and waiting times. 
Quality measures that are used differ across studies.9 Studies 
use either mortality rates,17 readmission rates,8 patient 
reported outcomes or report cards5,6,12-14,18,19 or, as in our study, 
hospital reputation and composite scores.4,15,16 These studies 
tend to find that quality has a small but positive impact on 
either hospital volume or hospital choice, and some find the 
impact to be weak or insignificant. More research on this topic 
is warranted because a systematic review in 2011,27 concluded 
that at that time the available evidence was too limited to 
show how performance data influences the behaviour of 
consumers, providers and purchasers of healthcare.
Our paper is closely related to Gutacker et al14 who argue that 
hospital choice for a hospital is strongly related to the type 
of quality that is available. While many studies of quality 
and choice of hospitals have used general quality measures, 
such as mortality and readmission rates, few studies use 
quality indicators for specific treatments. Gutacker et al use 
detailed patient reports of health outcomes specific for hip 
replacement, and find that a one standard deviation increase 
in average health gain increases demand by up to 10%. They 
also find that more traditional measures of hospital quality 
are less important in determining hospital choice. In this 
paper we also use two different types of quality indicators; 
one indicator for overall hospital quality and one indicator 
specific for cataract treatments.
Moreover we allow in our estimations for a nonlinear 
impact of quality information on patient volume or 
hospital choice. Many previous studies tend to find such 
effects.17-19 For example, Wang et al18 finds that after public 
reporting, surgeons with poor cardiac care report cards treat 
significantly less patients, while highly ranked surgeons did 
not treat significantly more patients. Dranove and Sfekas19 
use a conditional choice model to test whether patients move 
to better quality hospitals as a result of introducing hospital 
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report cards. They find that patients shift to better performing 
hospitals after the introduction of hospital report cards. 
This effect is however mainly driven by patients avoiding 
lower quality hospitals; they did not find that higher quality 
hospitals were able to attract significantly more patients. 
Methods
The main dataset consists of all patients who underwent a 
cataract treatment (as defined by DBC[2] -code 110005540031) 
in the Netherlands during the years 2006-2011. This data was 
obtained from the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa)[3]. For 
each treatment, the dataset contains the patients’ zip code, the 
unique hospital code and year of treatment. The total sample 
consists of 854 613 DBCs (the sum of the total numbers of 
DBCs for the years 2006-2011, as reported in the first row of 
Table 1). 
From this we derived the following variables: ‘total DBCs’ 
(total number of cataract treatments), ‘total number of 
hospitals,’ (number of hospitals in which cataract treatments 
were carried out) and ‘average distance (in km)’ (the average 
distance from the patients zip code to the hospital in km). 
In addition, we obtained the average waiting times from the 
NZa, creating the variable ‘average waiting time (in weeks).’ 
Finally we included two quality variables: one quality score 
for the specialism ophthalmology, ‘average ophthalmologist 
quality,’ and a quality score for the overall quality of the 
hospital ‘average overall hospital quality.’ 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics on all variables used. 
Total number of DBCs increase over the years and are carried 
out in approximately 150 hospitals. The average hospital 
performs about 1000 cataracts annually. The other variables 
in the table are discussed in the next section.
Data description
Quality 
Table 1 summarizes two quality indicators that are obtained 
from the Dutch weekly magazine Elsevier28: “average 
ophthalmologist quality” and “average overall hospital 
quality.” Elsevier publishes the quality of Dutch hospitals 
annually. 
The indicator ‘average overall hospital quality’ was published 
in all years: 2007-2011 and is based on process, structure as 
well as outcomes measures[4]. During these years Elsevier 
has changed the specification of their quality indicator. More 
specifically, in 2007, overall hospital quality was based on 
seven quality measures, in 2008 on 23, in 2009 on 6, and 
in 2010-2011 on 4 quality measures. In 2011 the indicators 
were for example: (1) service/information, (2) shorter waiting 
times, (3) safety and, (4) effectiveness. These four indicators 
were based on 183 underlying indicators including for 
example: usage of ICT, whether an eczema patient is able to 
contact his dermatologist outside contact hours, whether 
annual appointments can be scheduled in one day etcetera. 
In addition, the scaling of the quality measures also differed 
across the years. For reasons of comparison, the annual overall 
hospital quality scores were converted to an equal scale of 
1-10. Figure 1A shows the average hospital quality scores in 
the period 2007-2011 per hospital. On the horizontal axis, 
hospitals are ranked based on patient volume (that is: the 
lower the patient volume the further to the right). The figure 
shows a wide variation in quality.
In addition, the Dutch magazine Elsevier published quality 
indicators for specific specialisms, including ophthalmology. 
The indicator “average ophthalmologist quality” is based on 
survey information. Respondents of this survey were asked to 
judge a maximum of four hospitals, and were asked to indicate 
whether these hospitals stand out in terms of their medical 
services and practice management in relation to cataract 
treatments. The respondents include medical specialists, 
head nurses and head of departments such as intensive care 
or operating rooms, GPs, managers and directors of hospitals. 
Therefore, this indicator is likely to capture the reputation of 
ophthalmologists in a hospital[5]. The ophthalmologist quality 
indicator was only published for the years 2008 and 2009. 
In 2008 and 2009 there were, 4.787 and 4.441 respondents 
respectively, of which 2.862 and 2.519 medical specialists. The 
ophthalmologist average quality scores over the 2 years 2008 
and 2009 are between 0-100 and are for each hospital shown in 
Figure 1B. On the horizontal axis, hospitals are again ranked 
from high to low patient volume. The figure shows that the 
largest hospital is an outlier, with a quality score ranging 
between 70 and 80, and the remaining hospitals have quality 
Table 1. Summary Statisticsa
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total DBCs 117 980 139 474 151 972 145 097 151 826 148 264
Total number of hospitals 149 149 151 152 153 153
Average distance (km) 13.48 13.20 13.66 14.26 14.44 16.40
Average waiting time (wk) 6.73 6.71 6.22 5.23 5.25 4.85
Average overall hospital quality (on a scale of 1-10)  5.09 5.14 5.08 5.77 5.49
Average ophthalmologist quality (on a scale of 1-100) 18.48 19.14
Abbreviation: DBC, Diagnose Behandel Combinatie.
a The total number of DBC’s for 2006-2011 was 854 613. In our dataset there are 8 university hospitals, 88 general hospitals in 2006 to 85 in 2011, and 
the remaining hospitals are independent treatment centers. The average distance to the visited hospital was taken over all 854 613 individuals. The annual 
average waiting times is taken over all hospitals. Each overall hospital quality score represents the average quality of a hospital for all treatments (and thus not 
necessarily cataract treatments). Overall hospital quality scores were only available for the years 2007-2011. Each ophthalmologist quality score represents the 
average quality of ophthalmologists in a hospital. Ophthalmologist quality scores were only available for the years 2008 and 2009. The annual average quality 
measures are taken over all hospitals. All averages in the table are unweighted averages.
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scores ranging between about 0-40, with one exception where 
one medium sized hospital having an average quality score 
between 50-60.
Control Variables
The data on yearly average waiting time in weeks per hospital 
was also obtained from the NZa. The average waiting time 
was available for the years 2006-2011, the average waiting 
time of all hospitals in this period was 5 weeks and 6 days 
(5.80 weeks). Over time, this average waiting time steadily 
declined, starting from 6 weeks and 5 days (6.73 weeks) in 
2006 to 4 weeks and 6 days (4.85 weeks) in 2011 (Table 1). 
Furthermore, hospitals showed great variation in the average 
waiting time, the minimum and maximum waiting time in 
this data set was 0 and 21 weeks.
The control variable distance is based on the kilometres 
between the patients’ zip code of residence and the hospitals’ 
zip code[6]. The average number of kilometres that patients 
travelled to hospitals in this sample increases slightly over 
time, from 13.48 km in 2006 to 16.40 km in 2011 (Table 1)[7]. 
The majority of the patients does not travel far, although there 
are some outliers. Figure 2 shows the distribution of patients 
travelling 0-20 km, 20-40 km, 40-60 km and 60+ km. This 
figure illustrates that approximately 80% of the patients visit 
a hospital within a range of 20 km, and 15% travels 20-40 
km. Very few patients travel to hospitals located further than 
40 km. In the total sample, 37% of the patients bypassed the 
closest hospital, while 88% of the patients who visited the top 
performing hospital bypassed the closest hospital.
Estimation Method
Aggregate-Level Analysis
At the aggregate level, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model is used to estimate the effect of quality on patient 
volume for the years 2008-2011. Similar to Pope4 the OLS 
model is estimated as follows: 
Yi,t = α + β1wi,t + β2Qi,t-1 + Υt + εi,t
Yi,t represents the total number of cataract treatments carried 
out at hospital i, in year t. Variable wi,t is the average annual 
waiting time in weeks for hospital i in year t. The term Qi,t-1 is a 
vector of lagged ophthalmologist and lagged overall quality of 
hospital I[8]. The overall hospital quality scores of 2007-2010 
were used as lagged quality scores for the years 2008-2011. 
Since for the ophthalmologist quality scores we do not have 
information for all years, we used in the regression the quality 
scores in 2008 as a proxy for the lagged quality indicator for 
2008 and the ophthalmologist quality score in 2009 as a proxy 
for the lagged quality indicator for 2011. Year dummies, Υt, 
are included to capture year-specific effects. Fortunately, the 
annual variation of hospital quality is limited making these 
proxies fairly reliable[9]. To explore to what extent the impact 
of ophthalmologist quality on patient volume is driven by the 
top performing hospital, we run the regression one more time 
without the top performing hospital.
The OLS model has two potential limitations. First, it does 
not control for differences between hospitals. A fixed effects 
model is run to control for unobserved provider differences 
such as: the number of specialists, the resources available, 
spare capacity.30 Second, this OLS model does not allow for 
the inclusion of the variable distance, therefore the analysis 
continues with a patient choice model at the individual-level. 
Individual-Level Analysis
A mixed logit model is used for the individual-level analysis, 
as this is generally used to model hospital choice on a patient-
level.11 The model is used to analyse how patients make trade-
offs between quality, distance and waiting time. The mixed 
logit model is more flexible than the conditional logit model 
Figure 1. (A) Overall Hospital Quality (Range 0-10). (B) Ophthalmologist 
Quality Scores (Range 0-100).
Figure 2. Distance Travelled Over Time (Per Distance Category).
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scores ranging between about 0-40, with one exception where 
one medium sized hospital having an average quality score 
between 50-60.
Control Variables
The data on yearly average waiting time in weeks per hospital 
was also obtained from the NZa. The average waiting time 
was available for the years 2006-2011, the average waiting 
time of all hospitals in this period was 5 weeks and 6 days 
(5.80 weeks). Over time, this average waiting time steadily 
declined, starting from 6 weeks and 5 days (6.73 weeks) in 
2006 to 4 weeks and 6 days (4.85 weeks) in 2011 (Table 1). 
Furthermore, hospitals showed great variation in the average 
waiting time, the minimum and maximum waiting time in 
this data set was 0 and 21 weeks.
The control variable distance is based on the kilometres 
between the patients’ zip code of residence and the hospitals’ 
zip code[6]. The average number of kilometres that patients 
travelled to hospitals in this sample increases slightly over 
time, from 13.48 km in 2006 to 16.40 km in 2011 (Table 1)[7]. 
The majority of the patients does not travel far, although there 
are some outliers. Figure 2 shows the distribution of patients 
travelling 0-20 km, 20-40 km, 40-60 km and 60+ km. This 
figure illustrates that approximately 80% of the patients visit 
a hospital within a range of 20 km, and 15% travels 20-40 
km. Very few patients travel to hospitals located further than 
40 km. In the total sample, 37% of the patients bypassed the 
closest hospital, while 88% of the patients who visited the top 
performing hospital bypassed the closest hospital.
Estimation Method
Aggregate-Level Analysis
At the aggregate level, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model is used to estimate the effect of quality on patient 
volume for the years 2008-2011. Similar to Pope4 the OLS 
model is estimated as follows: 
Yi,t = α + β1wi,t + β2Qi,t-1 + Υt + εi,t
Yi,t represents the total number of cataract treatments carried 
out at hospital i, in year t. Variable wi,t is the average annual 
waiting time in weeks for hospital i in year t. The term Qi,t-1 is a 
vector of lagged ophthalmologist and lagged overall quality of 
hospital I[8]. The overall hospital quality scores of 2007-2010 
were used as lagged quality scores for the years 2008-2011. 
Since for the ophthalmologist quality scores we do not have 
information for all years, we used in the regression the quality 
scores in 2008 as a proxy for the lagged quality indicator for 
2008 and the ophthalmologist quality score in 2009 as a proxy 
for the lagged quality indicator for 2011. Year dummies, Υt, 
are included to capture year-specific effects. Fortunately, the 
annual variation of hospital quality is limited making these 
proxies fairly reliable[9]. To explore to what extent the impact 
of ophthalmologist quality on patient volume is driven by the 
top performing hospital, we run the regression one more time 
without the top performing hospital.
The OLS model has two potential limitations. First, it does 
not control for differences between hospitals. A fixed effects 
model is run to control for unobserved provider differences 
such as: the number of specialists, the resources available, 
spare capacity.30 Second, this OLS model does not allow for 
the inclusion of the variable distance, therefore the analysis 
continues with a patient choice model at the individual-level. 
Individual-Level Analysis
A mixed logit model is used for the individual-level analysis, 
as this is generally used to model hospital choice on a patient-
level.11 The model is used to analyse how patients make trade-
offs between quality, distance and waiting time. The ixed 
logit model is more flexible than the conditional logit model 
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scores ranging bet een about 0-40, ith one exception here 
one ediu  sized hospital having an average quality score 
bet een 50-60.
Control ariables
The data on yearly average aiting ti e in eeks per hospital 
as also obtained fro  the Za. The average aiting ti e 
as available for the years 2006-2011, the average aiting 
ti e of all hospitals in this period as 5 eeks and 6 days 
(5.80 eeks). ver ti e, this average aiting ti e steadily 
declined, starting fro  6 eeks and 5 days (6.73 eeks) in 
2006 to 4 eeks and 6 days (4.85 eeks) in 2011 (Table 1). 
Further ore, hospitals sho ed great variation in the average 
aiting ti e, the ini u  and axi u  aiting ti e in 
this data set was 0 and 21 weeks.
The control variable distance is based on the kilo etres 
between the patients’ zip code of residence and the hospitals’ 
zip code[6]. The average nu ber of kilo etres that patients 
travelled to hospitals in this sa ple increases slightly over 
ti e, fro  13.48 k  in 2006 to 16.40 k  in 2011 (Table 1)[7]. 
The ajority of the patients does not travel far, although there 
are so e outliers. Figure 2 shows the distribution of patients 
travelling 0-20 k , 20-40 k , 40-60 k  and 60+ k . This 
figure illustrates that approxi ately 80  of the patients visit 
a hospital within a range of 20 k , and 15  travels 20-40 
k . Very few patients travel to hospitals located further than 
40 k . In the total sa ple, 37  of the patients bypassed the 
closest hospital, while 88  of the patients who visited the top 
perfor ing hospital bypa sed the closest hospital.
Esti ation ethod
gregate-Level nalysis
t the a gregate level, a si ple ordinary least sq ares (  
odel is used to esti ate the effect of quality  ti t 
volu e for the years 2008-2011. Si ilar to Po e4 t e  
odel is esti ated as follo s: 
Yi,t = α  β1 i,t  β2 i,t-1  t  εi,t
Yi,t represents the total nu ber of cataract treat ents carried 
out at hospital i, in year t. ariable i,t is the average annual 
aiting ti e in eeks for hospital i in year t. The ter  i,t-1 is a 
vector of lagged ophthal ologist and lagged overall quality of 
hospital I[8]. The overall hospital quality scores of 2007-2010 
ere used as lagged quality scores for the years 2008-2011. 
Since for the ophthal ologist quality scores e do not have 
infor ation for all years, e used in the regression the quality 
scores in 2008 as a proxy for the lagged quality indicator for 
2008 and the ophthal ologist quality score in 2009 as a proxy 
for the lagged quality indicator for 2011. Year du ies, Υt, 
are included to capture year-specific effects. Fortunately, the 
annual variation of hospital quality is li ited aking these 
proxies fairly reliable[9]. To explore to hat extent the i pact 
of ophthal ologist quality on patient volu e is driven by the 
top perfor ing hospital, e run the regression one ore ti e 
ithout the top perfor ing hospital.
The LS odel has two potential li itations. First, it does 
not control for differences between hospitals.  fixed effects 
odel is run to control for unobserved provider differences 
such as: the nu ber of specialists, the resources available, 
spare capacity.30 Second, this LS odel does not allow for 
the inclusion of the variable distance, therefore the analysis 
continues with a patient choice odel at the individual-level. 
Individual-Level Analysis
A ixed logit odel is used for the individual-level analysis, 
as this is generally used to odel hospital choice on a patient-
level.11 The odel is used to analyse how patients ake trade-
offs between quality, distance and waiting ti e. The ixed 
logit odel is ore flexible than the conditional logit odel 
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scores ranging between about 0-40, with on  exception where 
one medium sized hospital having an average quality score 
between 50-60.
Control Variables
The data on yearly average waiting time in weeks per hospital 
was also obtained from the NZa. The average waiting time 
was available for the years 2006-2011, the average waiting 
time of all hospitals in this period was 5 weeks and 6 days 
(5.80 weeks). Over time, this average waiting time steadily 
declined, starting from 6 weeks and 5 days (6.73 weeks) in 
2006 to 4 weeks and 6 days (4.85 weeks) in 2011 (Table 1). 
Furthermore, hospitals showed great variation in the average 
waiting time, the minimum and maximum waiting time in 
this data set as 0 and 21 eeks.
The control variable distance is based on the kilometres 
bet een the patients’ zip code of residence and the hospitals’ 
zip code[6]. The average number of kilometres that patients 
travelled to hospitals in this sample increases slightly over 
time, from 13.48 km in 2006 to 16.40 km in 2011 (Table 1)[7]. 
The majority of the patients does not travel far, although there 
are some outliers. Figure 2 sho s the distribution of patients 
travelling 0-20 km, 20-40 km, 40-60 km and 60+ km. This 
figure illustrates that approximately 80% of the patients visit 
a hospital ithin a range of 20 km, and 15% travels 20-40 
km. ery fe  patients travel to hospitals located further than 
40 km. In the total sample, 37% of the patients bypassed the 
closest hospital, hile 88% of the patients ho visited the top 
performing hospital bypassed the closest hospital.
Estimation Method
A gregate-Level Analysis
At the a gregate level, a simple ordinary least sq ares (  
model is used to estimate the e fect of quality  ti  
volume for the years 2008-2011. Si ilar to Po e4 t   
model is estimated as fo lows: 
Yi,t = α + β1wi,t + β2Qi,t-1 + Υt + εi,t
Yi,t represents the total number of cataract treat e ts r i  
out at hospital i, in year t. Variable wi,t is the average l 
waiting time in w eks for hospital i in year t. he ter  i,t-1 i   
vector of la ged ophthalmologist and lagged overall lit  f 
hospital I[8]. The overall hospital quality scores of 2 -  
were used as la ged quality scores for the years 2 - . 
Since for the ophthalmologist quality scores e  t  
information for all years, we used in the regressio  t e ality 
scores in 2008 as a proxy for the lagged quality i dicator for 
2008 and the ophthalmologist quality score in 2009 as a proxy 
for the lagged quality indicator for 2011. Year du ies, Υt, 
are included to capture year-specific effects. Fortunately, the 
annual variation of hospital quality is li ited aking these 
proxies fairly reliable[9]. To explore to what extent the impact 
of ophthalmologist quality on patient volume is driven by the 
top performing hospital, we run the regression one more time 
without the top performing hospital.
The OLS model has t o potential limitations. First, it does 
not control for differences bet een hospitals. A fixed effects 
model is run to control for unobserved provider differences 
such as: the number of specialists, the resources available, 
spare capacity.30 Second, this OLS model does not allo  for 
the inclusion of the variable distance, therefore the analysis 
continues ith a patient choice model at the individual-level. 
Individual-Level nalysis
 mixed logit model is used for the individual-level analysis, 
as this is generally used to model hospital choice on a patient-
level.11 The model is used to analyse ho  patients make trade-
offs bet een quality, distance and aiting time. The mixed 
logit model is more flexible than the conditional logit model 
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because it allows for random taste variation, unrestricted 
substitution patterns and correlation in unobserved factors 
over time.31 Under the mixed logit model the parameters 
that are associated with each observed variable are not fixed, 
but allows for variation at the patient level. The conditional 
logit model on the other hand, assumes the parameters are 
fixed; hence differences in preferences are related to observed 
characteristics of the patient and are captured through the 
inclusion of interaction variables. We use a standard utility 
function of individual i attending hospital q in time t: 
, , , , , , ,  i q t i t i q t i q tU X eα β′= + +
Xi,q,t represents the explanatory variables quality, distance 
and waiting time. The error term ei,q,t is also unobserved and 
is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. 
Parameter ,i tβ ′  is a vector of coefficients and is unobserved. 
Parameter ,i tβ ′  is treated as a random parameter and is 
integrated over all its possible values of β, then weighted by 
the density of β to obtain the unconditional choice probability, 
Pi,q,t of person i, choosing hospital q, in year t.
, ,
, ,, ,
( ) ( ) |
i q t
i q t
x
i q t x
j
eP g d
e
β
β β β
′
′= ∗∫ ∑
Our data set consists of 854 613 patients who are free to choose 
from 150 hospital locations. Unfortunately, a mixed logit 
cannot be computed with a data set of this format. Therefore, 
the dataset is reduced by confining to the years 2009 and 
2010, and by restricting the patients’ choice set. The set is 
reduced to the years 2009 and 2010 because the lagged quality 
indicator ophthalmologist is only available for these 2 years. 
In addition, the individual hospital choice set is restricted to 
the 20 closest hospitals only. So, instead of having all hospitals 
in the choice set for all patients, we composed a choice set 
of the 20 closest hospitals only (based on distance) for every 
individual. Allowing for larger choice sets than the closest 20 
hospitals did not alter the results significantly as the majority 
of the patients’ choices were among the closest 20 hospitals[10]. 
These two restrictions resulted for the years 2009 and 2010 in 
2 996 205 patient-hospital combinations that are used in the 
estimations.   
To estimate whether people have a stronger preference for the 
top performing hospital, the model is estimated twice, first 
with quality for ophthalmology in linear form, and second 
with quality dummies allowing for nonlinear effects. The 
average score of the variable quality ophthalmologist in the 
year 2009 and 2010 is used as the quality indicator. Quality 
dummies are created for every 10-point interval up until 70-
80 (as all scores were <80). Quality dummy 0-10 is excluded 
to avoid multicollinearity). In both regressions, all coefficients 
are assumed to be normally distributed. 
In addition, the literature states a nonlinear effect of distance 
where the negative utility of having to travel an additional 
kilometre is expected to fall with distance. To allow for 
this nonlinearity, the following distance dummies are 
incorporated: 0-20 km, 20-40 km, 40-60 km, 60-80 km, 80-100 
km and 100+ km (the last dummy variable is again excluded 
from the regression to avoid multicollinearity). 
For reasons of comparison, both regressions were also run 
using a conditional logit. The conditional logit serves as a 
good comparison to the mixed logit as this generally yields 
similar results. The mixed logit is more preferred as it relaxes 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption and 
generally yields more precise estimates, the coefficients 
however tend to be of similar size.32
Results 
Table 2 depicts the correlation matrix of the variables at the 
hospital level: patient volume (total number of DBCs at a 
hospital), waiting time, ophthalmologist and hospital quality. 
The matrix shows that both quality variables are positively 
correlated with patient volume. The variable ophthalmologist 
quality shows however a much stronger correlation with 
patient volume than overall hospital quality, 47 and 15 
percent respectively. The correlation between the two quality 
variables is fairly low (12%), indicating that there is a large 
variation in quality across different specialties in hospitals. 
Table 3 shows a similar correlation matrix, without the top 
performing hospital. The correlation of patient volume with 
ophthalmologist quality almost halves from 48% to 26%. 
Whereas the correlation of patient volume with hospital 
quality lowers only slightly from 15% to 13%. In addition, 
patient volume and waiting time is negatively correlated in 
both tables which suggests that hospitals with longer waiting 
times experience somewhat lower patient volumes. Waiting 
time is also negatively correlated with both quality indicators 
suggesting that better quality hospitals generally have lower 
waiting times. 
Aggregate-Level Results
Table 4 shows the aggregate level results of the impact of 
quality on patient volume. The first two columns represent 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix: Volume, Waiting Time, and Qualitya
Patient Volume Waiting Time Ophthalmologist Quality Overall Hospital Quality
Patient volume 1.0000
Waiting time -0.1778 1.0000
Ophthalmologist quality 0.4748 -0.1434 1.0000
Overall hospital quality 0.1518 -0.1144 0.1176 1.0000
a The coefficients are Pearson correlation coefficients and calculated at the hospital level for all available years (see Table 1). For example, -0.1778 is the Pearson 
correlation coefficient of patient volume (the annual number of DBC’s in a hospital) correlated with the annual average waiting times for that hospital. The 
correlation coefficient is calculated for all available years 2006-2011.
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the analysis based on all hospitals, with and without overall 
hospital quality (columns 2 and 1 respectively). The first 
two columns show that ophthalmologist quality is positively 
correlated with patient volume. In the years 2008 and 2009, 
a one-point increase in ophthalmologist quality (on a scale 
of 1-100) results in approximately 57 and 64 more patients 
respectively for the average hospital, which translates into 
a patient volume increase of 4%. Over time, this impact 
declined somewhat: in 2010 and 2011, a one-point increase 
in ophthalmologist quality is associated with a patient volume 
increase of about 2%. Column 2 shows the results after 
adding overall hospital quality to the regression. The results 
show that overall hospital quality is insignificant. Overall 
hospital quality does also not appear to affect the results for 
ophthalmologist quality, as the impact of ophthalmologist on 
patient volume is similar in columns 1 and 2. The remaining 
indicator, waiting time, is significant and negatively associated 
with patient volume: an increase in waiting time by one-week 
results in 66 fewer patients, or a patient volume decline of 4 
percent for the average hospital. 
The same analysis was then done after omitting the top 
performing hospital in the regression. The results are shown 
in columns 3 and 4. Comparing columns 1 and 2 with 
columns 3 and 4 indicates that the positive impact of quality 
on patient volume is largely driven by the top performing 
hospital. After eliminating the top performing hospital from 
the sample, the impact of ophthalmologist quality on patient 
volume halves and is no longer significant in 2010 and 2011. 
In 2008 and 2009, a one-point increase in ophthalmologist 
quality now results in respectively 27 and 28 more patients, 
which translates into a patient volume increase of about 2% 
(instead of 4%). 
In addition to the OLS model, a fixed effects model (not 
reported here) was also run using the same variables. In the 
fixed effects model however none of the variables turn out to 
be significant[11].
Individual-Level Results
The individual level results are presented in Table 5. For 
every variable the mean and standard error of the coefficient 
is presented in the first row. The second row shows the 
value of the standard deviation of the coefficient and the 
corresponding standard error. 
Table 5, column 1, confirms the aggregate level findings 
in that people prefer quality hospitals and hospitals that 
are associated with lower waiting times. The indicator on 
ophthalmologist quality is positive and statistically significant 
(0.032). The mean coefficient on waiting time is negative and 
statistically significant (-0.01). Furthermore, the individual 
level results suggest that patients prefer hospitals that are 
close by and that the impact of distance on hospital choice 
is nonlinear. The mean coefficient on the distance dummies 
grows smaller as distance grows: for example, people prefer a 
hospital within a range of 0-20 km as opposed to 20-40 km, 
as the corresponding mean coefficients are 7.50 and 4.53 
respectively. Furthermore, the gap between the coefficients 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix: Volume, Waiting Time, and Quality (Excluding the Top Performing Hospital)a
Patient Volume Waiting Time Ophthalmologist Quality Overall Hospital Quality
Patient volume 1.0000
Waiting time -0.1587 1.0000
Ophthalmologist quality 0.2568 -0.1153 1.0000
Overall hospital quality 0.1259 -0.1087 0.0841 1.0000
a The coefficients are Pearson correlation coefficients and calculated at the hospital level for all available years (see Table 1). For example, 0.2568 is the Pearson 
correlation coefficient of patient volume (the annual number of DBC’s in a hospital) correlated with the annual ophthalmologist quality score for that hospital. 
The correlation coefficient is calculated for the two available years 2008-2009.
Table 4. Patient Volume, Ophthalmologist Quality and Overall Hospital Quality
All Hospitals Without Top Performing Hospital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ophthalmologist quality 2008 56.56*** (10.35) 52.96*** (10.84) 33.76** (11.23) 27.09* (11.64)
Ophthalmologist quality 2009 63.93*** (11.44) 61.43*** (11.73) 31.90* (12.97) 27.95* (13.09)
Ophthalmologist quality 2010 34.08*** (9.08) 35.55*** (9.64) 15.67 (10.74) 14.40 (11.45)
Ophthalmologist quality 2011 34.07*** (9.21) 32.77** (9.73) 5.69 (11.03) 1.06 (11.61)
Overall hospital quality 2008 18.40 (38.28) 13.85 (34.73)
Overall hospital quality 2009 43.62 (39.71) 39.49 (36.02)
Overall hospital quality 2010 -47.56 (59.58) -48.57 (54.04)
Overall hospital quality 2011 25.61 (44.88) 38.94 (40.81)
Waiting time -66.11*** (15.24) -66.75*** (16.96) -64.60*** (14.11) -65.68*** (15.12)
N 317 284 313 280
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.26 0.10 0.08
(1) Year dummies are not presented here. 
(2) * Significant at P < .05; ** Significant at P < .01; *** Significant at P < .001. 
(3) The sample size in column (2), N = 284, and (4), N = 280, is smaller than in column (1), N = 317, and (3), N=313, because for 33 hospitals the overall hospital 
quality indicator was missing.
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becomes smaller as distance grows: 7.50-4.53>4.53-2.22>2.22-
1.19, implying that the negative utility derived from having to 
travel an additional kilometre declines with distance.
Although the indicators quality and distance cannot be 
interpreted individually, the willingness to travel for quality 
can be estimated. This is done by comparing the utility derived 
from quality and distance: the coefficient on ophthalmologist 
quality is .032, and the difference between the utility gained 
from choosing a hospital within a range of 0-20 km as 
opposed to 20-40 km is 2.97 (7.50-4.53 = 2.97). This suggests 
that patients value the hospital being within a range of 0-20 
km as opposed to 20-40 km 9 times more than a hospital 
having 10 points higher quality. In other words, for every 
10 patients, one patient will choose to travel 20-40 km for a 
10-point quality gain, while the other nine will visit a hospital 
that is within 20 km. More specifically, the results also allow 
us to calculate by how many kilometres patients are willing 
to travel for a one-point increase in quality. For example, if a 
hospital is located within a range of 20 km, the negative utility 
for travelling an additional kilometre is 2.97/20 = 0.15. This 
implies that patients are willing to travel 0.032/0.15 = 0.2 km 
more for a one-point increase in quality.
Table 5 column 2 suggests that people have a strong preference 
for the top performing hospital, but appear indifferent 
between the remaining hospitals. The coefficient mean on 
ophthalmologist 70-80 (2.53) is more than two times higher 
than that of the remaining quality dummies, suggesting that 
patients have a stronger preference for the top performing 
hospital. Given that the coefficient means on the remaining 
quality dummies are similar (0.80: 0.90: 1.09: 0.87), patients 
appear indifferent between these hospitals. Hospitals falling 
in these categories are however preferred over hospitals that 
fall in the reference group (Ophthalmologist: 0-10). 
Patients show moderate variation in how they make trade-
offs when choosing a hospital. For some of the variables the 
standard deviation of the coefficient is significant, which 
implies that there is patient heterogeneity. More specifically, 
column 2 shows that patient heterogeneity exists for hospitals 
with a quality score ranging between 70-80 and 30-40. For 
the remaining quality categories, patient heterogeneity is 
not significant. In addition, we find that patients do not vary 
significantly in how they value distance (except for distance 
dummy 0-20 km in the first regression). 
As a robustness check, the results of the conditional logit are 
presented in Table S1 in Supplementary file 1. The table shows 
almost identical results to the mixed logit estimates.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper explores trends in quality on hospital volume and 
hospital choice. Both the aggregate-level and individual-level 
results suggest that our ophthalmologist quality measure is 
positive correlated with hospital volume and hospital choice, 
similar to previous studies.4-6,8,11,14,15 As in Gutacker et al14 we 
find only a significant result for the ophthalmologist quality 
indicator and not for the overall hospital quality indicator. 
Moreover, the positive impact is non-linear, where the top 
Table 5. Mixed Logit
Parameter
(1) (2)
Value SE Value SE
Ophthalmologist quality
Mean of coefficient 0.032*** (0.00)
SD of coefficient 0.01*** (0.00)
Ophthalmologist quality 70-80
Mean of coefficient 2.53*** (0.02)
SD of coefficient 0.70*** (0.05)
Ophthalmologist quality 50-60 
Mean of coefficient 0.80*** (0.04)
SD of coefficient 0.20 (0.13)
Ophthalmologist quality 30-40
Mean of coefficient 0.90*** (0.02)
SD of coefficient 0.96*** (0.03)
Ophthalmologist quality 20-30 
Mean of coefficient 1.09*** (0.01)
SD of coefficient 0.01 (0.02)
Ophthalmologist quality 10-20 
Mean of coefficient 0.87*** (0.01)
SD of coefficient 0.01 (0.01)
Distance: 0-20 km
Mean of coefficient 7.50*** (0.06) 7.54*** (0.06)
SD of coefficient 0.11** (0.04) 0.00 (0.01)
Distance: 20-40 km 
Mean of coefficient 4.53*** (0.05) 4.55*** (0.06)
SD of coefficient 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01)
Distance: 40-60 km
Mean of coefficient 2.22*** (0.06) 2.26*** (0.06)
SD of coefficient 0.18 (0.10) 0.05 (0.03)
Distance: 60-80 km
Mean of coefficient 1.19*** (0.06) 1.25*** (0.06)
SD of coefficient 0.07 (0.06) 0.02 (0.05)
Waiting time
Mean of coefficient -0.01*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00)
SD of coefficient -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Log likelihood -242 184 -240 920
No. of observations 2 665 880 2 665 880
Abbreviations: SE, standard error; SD, standard deviation.
(1) Year dummies are not presented here. 
(2) * Significant at P < .05; ** Significant at P < .01; *** Significant at P < .001. 
Ruwaard and Douven
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2018, 7(12), 1120–1129 1127
performing hospital attracts significantly more patients than 
would be expected based on linear quality differences. In 
contrast, some previous studies found a nonlinear impact 
in that after reporting on quality, patient volume for poor 
performing providers declined, whereas patient volume did 
not increase for high performing hospital.7,17-19 These findings 
may be related to the type of treatment and quality variable 
considered. For example, Cutler et al,17 Dranove and Sfekas,19 
and Wang et al18 all relied on mortality rates for cardiac 
care. As the chance and severity of complications for such a 
complex treatment are likely to be higher than for relatively 
simply cataract treatments, people may be more sensitive 
to quality differences in the bottom segment of the market 
and respond by avoiding poor performers. Mennemeyer et 
al7 show that information about mortality rates that were 
different from the patients expectations did not alter market 
shares significantly; however reporting on unexpected deaths 
in the news had a significant negative impact on market 
shares. The negative information on unexpected deaths may 
be driving patients away, which is again reflected in the bottom 
segment of the market only. In addition, the distribution of 
the quality variable may be different in other previous studies. 
Our results suggest a strong impact at the top segment of the 
hospital market because the dataset contains a clear outlier in 
the upper segment, whereas the distribution of datasets used 
in other studies may not contain such an outlier at the top 
segment. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that there is moderate 
variation in how patients make trade-offs. Patients tend to 
either value quality and visit the top performing hospital, or 
they visit the nearest hospital. Although the top performing 
hospital has attracted a lot of people from far away, over the 
years far away patients seem to be increasingly travelling to 
other hospitals as well. We cannot explain this new trend 
in the market with our limited dataset but it suggest that 
other aspects, such as marketing, new quality measures 
that increasingly become available[12] or that enhanced 
competition plays a role. For example, the liberalization of 
the Dutch hospital market has led to more specialization of 
ophthalmology hospitals and new independent treatment 
centers have entered the market. 
Limitations
This research has several limitations. Most importantly, we 
considered only two imperfect indicators to measure hospital 
quality. Future research, with better quality data, will be 
necessary to see whether our results are robust. Healthcare 
quality has many different dimensions and in many countries 
more and more efforts are undertaken to measure quality. 
However this process is going slowly and for many hospital 
treatments decent output quality indicators are still not 
available. This research incorporated two quality indicators, 
one measure for overall hospital quality, and one specialism 
specific quality indicator. The two indicators reflect only 
imperfectly the underlying quality of a hospital and may also 
reflect hospital reputation. However, we used these quality 
indicators because they were available to the public. Some 
patients may have actually used this information to choose 
a hospital while others may have obtained a referral from 
their GP. Therefore, other hospital attributes (eg, reputation) 
or other sources of quality information (eg, GPs) that are 
correlated with these quality indicators may also explain 
our results. Unfortunately, the specialisms specific quality 
indicator for ophthalmology was only available for 2009 and 
2010. Therefore, in our individual-level analyses we could 
only use these two years and in our aggregate-level analyses 
proxies were used for the remaining years, thereby weakening 
the possibility to interpret the impact of quality on volume 
and patient choice. 
In addition, with respect to the ophthalmologist quality 
indicators, the top performing hospital is a clear outlier, largely 
driving the results. This allows for a careful interpretation 
of our results which may be very market specific. Also, the 
quality variable is imperfect because it is based on a survey 
and probably incorporates other quality aspects besides 
reputation, such as outcome, process and structural quality 
indicators. Since the survey is based on the opinions of GPs and 
other medical specialists, the indicator may also be positively 
correlated with referral patterns because survey respondents 
may provide referrals themselves. Another limitation of this 
variable is however that differences in quality scores are 
difficult to interpret; the cataract treatments are relatively easy 
to perform, so differences in medical outcomes are likely to be 
small. However, the fact that the top performing hospital is a 
clear outlier is confirmed by their reputation; it has acquired 
the status of centre of excellence and has received several 
additional awards for its quality in the past year. 
Furthermore, owing to the fact that the dataset was too 
large for conducting a mixed logit model we were forced to 
make decisions with respect to reducing the sample size. We 
restricted the choice set to the 20 closest hospitals for every 
person. Allowing for larger choice sets did not alter the results 
significantly. 
Whether a winner takes most strategy is applicable to 
other treatments will probably depend on the nature of the 
treatment and specific market characteristics. The findings 
suggest that for relatively standard cataract treatments it is 
possible to become a dominant player in the market. However, 
for some treatments a winner takes all strategy may be less 
rewarding. For example, in the market for kidney transplants 
the availability of transplants is very important and in case of 
urgent care the accessibility of care may be one of the most 
important factors. On the other hand, a winner takes most 
strategy may be rewarding for chronic diseases, as these 
patients may be more sensitive to quality differences. Further 
research would be needed to explore whether “a winner takes 
most” occurs for other treatments as well. 
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Endnotes
[1] In general, reverse causality may be a problem in these studies, where 
volume may be affecting quality due to learning effects. This study tries to rule 
this reverse causality argument out by focussing exclusively on standard day-
cataract treatments, and thus removing the more complex cataract treatment 
from our sample. Our communication with ophthalmologists confirmed that the 
cataract treatments that we study in this paper are relatively straightforward 
and could be performed by all eye-specialists. The reverse causality argument 
is much more relevant for highly complex care, such as treating heart attacks 
where specialization is important.
[2] In the Netherlands, hospital products are classified according to the 
Diagnosis Treatment Combination system (in Dutch: Diagnose Behandel 
Combinatie, DBC). It is a classification system similar to the Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs) in the United States. 
[3] The dataset includes all Dutch hospitals and almost all independent 
treatment centers that perform cataract treatments. We might be missing a few 
independent treatment centers as these were not legally required to report their 
DBCs to the Dutch Healthcare Authority.
[4] A process indicator relates to the activities and tasks the provider executed 
in delivering care, structure indicators relate to the number of resources and 
type of resources used in delivering care, and outcome measures relate to the 
impact the process of care has on health.29
[5] When Elsevier published a new quality indicator for eye specialism in 2011, 
it was no longer based on surveys, but it was based on publicly available 
performance indicators,28 the top-performing hospital in our study was not 
among the seven best hospitals in 2011.
[6] Another possible way to estimate travelling would have been in terms of time 
required to travel to the hospital. For example, Varkevisser et al25 use travel 
time by car between the patient’s zip code and hospital zip code. Actual travel 
time depends on the route and accessibility of public transportation. However, 
given that the Netherlands is a very densely populated country with good 
infrastructure, the distance in kilometres will be not that different from distance 
in travelling time, especially for people travelling far.  
[7] For the hospital with highest ophthalmologist score for quality, patients were 
willing to travel further, namely 21.10 km.
[8] Some studies insert the absolute values of quality (Bundorf et al,5  Jung et 
al,9  Varkevisser et al8), other studies use rankings (Pope4). 
[9] Indeed, we find a strong correlation of 72% for lagged ophthalmologist 
quality scores in the years 2009 and 2010.
[10] Sivey26 and Howard13 use a similar approach, they restrict the choice set 
to the closest 10 hospitals only. Our choice set is somewhat larger because 
the focus of this study is on the top performing hospital, and for precisely this 
hospital patients are willing to travel far. If a patients’ choice falls outside his/her 
choice set, the mixed logit is not able to estimate someone’s preferences hence 
the patient is dropped from the sample. If we allow for a choice set of twenty 
hospitals, only 2% of the patients are eliminated, and, only 7% of the patients 
that visited the top performing hospital is dropped. If the choice set is restricted 
to the closest ten hospitals only, then 5% of the patients are eliminated from the 
sample of which 18% of the patients travelled to the top performing hospital. 
[11] Results are available upon request. The fixed effects model yields 
insignificant outcomes as quality variation over time tends to be small, hence 
quality is largely absorbed in the fixed effects.  
[12] The fact Elsevier changed the quality indicator may have had a (negative) 
impact on the market position of the top  performing hospital. In addition, in 
the last years an increasing number of other quality indicators have become 
available. For instance, the Dutch website www.kiesbeter.nl collects and 
publishes quality indicators. These indicators are process indicators such as 
how does a patient value the communication with an ophthalmologist, a nurse 
and communication about medication. We tested also whether patient choice 
was related to these process indicators. Although not reported here, we found 
for two process indicators only a very weak positive correlation while the third, 
communication with an ophthalmologist, was weakly and negatively correlated 
with hospital choice. During the years of our study, these indicators received 
less attention in the public media. In addition, these indicators do not necessarily 
reflect outcome quality of a treatment.
Supplementary files
Supplementary file 1 contains Table S1.
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